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A DEFINITION OF "LIABILITIES" IN
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
SECTIONS 357 AN]
358(d)
Douglas A. Kahn* and Dale A. Oesterle**
NTEmRAL Revenue Code section 351(a) provides that no gain or
loss shall be recognized' if property2 is transferred to a corpo-
ration solely in exchange for its stock or securities and the trans-
ferors4 control the corporation immediately after the exchange.5
If, in addition to receiving stock or securities 'in an exchange that
would otherwise qualify for section 351 treatment, a transferor re-
ceives other property or money--"boot"-any realized gain is recog-
nized up to the amount of the money and the fair market value of
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan. B.A. 1955, University of North Caro-
lina; J.D. 1958, George Washington University.-Ed.
** Third-year student, University of Michigan Law School. B.A. 1972, M.P.F.
1974, University of Michigan.-Ed.
1. The transfer of property to a corporation in exchange for stock or securities
is a "sale or other disposition" of the property causing the transferor(s) to realize
gain or loss equal to the difference between the adjusted basis of the property
transferred and the value of the stock and securities received. INnERNAL REvENUE
CODE oF 1954 [hereinafter IRC], § 1001(a). Absent the section 351 exemption or some
other specific nonrecognition provision, the entire amount of the gain or loss so real-
ized would be recognized. IRC § 1002. See Estate of Kamborian v. Commissioner,
469 F.2d 219 (1st Cir. 1972); United States v. Frazell, 335 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 380 U.S. 961 (1965).
If a transaction meets the requirements of section 351, it is a tax-free exchange
regardless of the intention of the transferor(s). Pocatello Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v.
United States, 139 F. Supp. 912 (D. Idaho 1956) (dealing with Int. Rev. Code of 1939,
ch. 1, § 112(b)(5), 53 Stat. 37 (now IRC § 351)); Gus Russell Inc., 36 T.C. 965 (1961).
2. Although money is considered property for the purposes of section 351, see
Rev. Rul. 69-357, 1969-1 Cum. BuLL. 101, the contribution of services is not. Treas.
Reg. §§ 1.351-1(a)(1)(i), (a)(2) (Example (3)) (1955). See generally D. KAHN, BAsIc CoR-
rortAT TAXATION 333 (2d ed. 1973).
3. Short-term notes typically have been held not to be "securities." See Turner v.
Connissioner, 303 F.2d 94 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 922 (1962); Robert W.
Adams, 58 T.C. 41 (1972). Stock rights and stock warrants are not considered "stock."
See LeVant v. Commissioner, 376 F.2d 434 (7th Cir. 1967) (stock options); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.351-1(a)(1) (1955). For a general discussion of the definition given "stock or secu-
rities," see D. KAHN, supra note 2, at 343-45.
4. The transferors may be individuals, partnerships, trusts, estates, companies,
associations, corporations, or any combination of these. Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(a)(1)
(1955).
5. Immediately after the exchange the transferor(s) must own stock possessing at
least 80 per cent of the combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote
and at least 80 per cent of the total number of shares of each nonvoting class of
stock of the corporation. IRC § 368(c); Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(a)(1) (1955). For a dis-
cussion of the technicalities involved in defining control, see D. KAHN, supra note 2,
at 329-35.
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the other property received. The transferee corporation's assump-
tion of the transferor's liabilities or its acquisition from the trans-
feror of property subject to a liability is not treated as boot unless
the principal purpose of the assumption or acquisition was to avoid
federal income tax or was not a bona fide business purpose.7 Regard-
less of the transferor's purpose, however, he will recognize gain un-
der section 357(c) to the extent that the sum of the liabilities trans-
ferred exceeds the aggregate adjusted basis of the assets transferred.8
Section 357(c) has caused significant problems for cash method
taxpayers9 seeking to transfer the assets and liabilities of a going
business in a section 351 exchange.'0 In Peter Raich,"x a cash method
taxpayer transferred all of the assets and liabilities of his sole pro-
prietorship to a controlled corporation. The proprietorship's chief as-
set consisted of more than $77,000 in trade accounts receivable; its
liabilities exceeded $45,000 and included more than $37,000 in trade
accounts payable.' 2 While the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
6. IRC § 351(b). The receipt of boot, however, will not permit the recognition
of a loss realized on the exchange. IRC § 351(b)(2).
7. IRC § 357(b).
8. Mf the sum of the amount of the liabilities assumed, plus the amount of the
liabilities to which the property is subject, exceeds the total of the adjusted
basis of the property transferred pursuant to such exchange, then such excess
shall be considered as a gain from the sale or exchange of a capital asset or of
property which is not a capital asset, as the case may be.
IRC § 357(c).
Section 357(c) "gain" is computed for each transferor separately, Rev. Rul. 66-
142, 1966-1 Cui . BuLL. 66, and allocated among the properties transferred according
to their market value to determine the extent to which the transferor recognizes
the gain as long-term or short-term capital gain or ordinary income. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.357-2(b) (1955).
The constitutionality of section 357(c) was sustained in George W. Wiebusch, 59
T.C. 777, affd., 487 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1973).
9. Under the cash method, income is realized in the year that cash (or its equiva-
lent) is received, and deductions are taken in the year that payment is made. IRC
§§ 451, 461; Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(i) (1957). The relative simplicity of the cash
method makes it the choice of many salaried and professional individuals. G. ]BLArr-
MACHR & R. KNAPP, ACCOUNTING PmuoDs AND ACcoUNmNa MEHODS 34 (1955).
10. See D. KAHN, supra note 2, at 345-48.
Sections 357 and 358(d), the provisions dealing with the treatment of liabilities in
section 351 transactions, also apply to liabilities transferred in other tax-free ex-
changes (e.g., corporate reorganizations under section 361). See IRC §§ 357(a), 358(a).
The construction advocated in this article for sections 357 and 358 applies as well to
such other transactions. Note, however, that section 357(c) applies only to section 351
transfers and to "D" reorganizations under section 568(a)(1)(D).
11. 46 T.C. 604 (1966).
12. The transferred assets and liabilities were listed as follows:
Assets
Cash $ 1,04540
Trade Accounts Receivable 77,361.66
Receivables 1,833.97
Prepaid Rent 125.00
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stipulated that the transaction qualified as a section 351 exchange, 8
he successfully claimed in the Tax Court that the trade accounts
payable were liabilities within the terms of section 357(c), and that
the trade accounts receivable had a zero basis.' 4 Accordingly, al-
though the book value of the transferred assets was almost twice
the face amount of the transferor's liabilities, Raich recognized a
taxable gain of $34,741.08, the amount by which the liabilities as-
sumed by the corporation exceeded his basis in the transferred
assets.' 5 Two subsequent Tax Court cases, Wilford E. Thatcher'6
and David Rosen,17 have followed Raich; the Second Circuit, in
Bongiovanni v. Commissioner,'8 has rejected it.
While Raich dealt only with the application of section 357(c),
its principles would seem to require that accounts payable also con-
stitute liabilities under section 358(d).' 9 Section 358(a) provides
that the transferor's basis in the stock and securities received in a
section 351 exchange shall be the same as the basis of the property
transferred, decreased by the amount of any money and the fair
market value of any other property received and increased by the
amount of gain recognized on the exchange. Section 358(d), by treat-
ing assumed liabilities as "money received," reduces the basis of
stock and securities received by the amount of liabilities assumed
or accepted by the controlled corporation. If accounts payable are
Equipment $13,626.30
Less: Accumulated Depredation 5,378.94 8,247.36
Total $88,613.39
Liabilities
Trade Accounts Payable $37,719.78
Notes Payable 8,273.03
Total $45,992.81
46 T.C. at 605. The Commissioner argued that only the trade accounts receivable had
a zero basis; he gave a value basis of $1,833.97 to the other receivables. 46 T.C. at
607 n.5. That distinction does not seem to have been maintained in Wilford E.
Thatcher, 61 T.C. 28 (1973), appeal docketed, No. 74-2245, 9th Cir., July 1, 1974.
13. 46 T.C. at 606.
14. 46 T.C. at 610.
15. The gain recognized under section 357(c) represented the difference between
$45,992.81 in liabilities assumed and an adjusted basis in the assets transferred of
$11,251.73. See note 12 supra.
16. 61 T.C. 28 (1973), appeal docketed, No. 74-2245, 9th Cir., July 1, 1974 (transfer
by a partnership).
17. 62 T.C. 11 (1974) (transfer by a sole proprietorship).
18. 470 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1972).
19. "Where, as part of the consideration to the taxpayer, another party to the
exchange assumed a liability of the taxpayer or acquired from the taxpayer property
subject to a liability, such assumption or acquisition (in the amount of the liability)
shall, for purposes of this section, be treated as money received by the taxpayer on
the exchange."
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treated as section 358(d) liabilities, and if accounts receivable have
a zero basis for the purposes of section 358(a), the cash method
taxpayer with a balance sheet similar to that of the taxpayer in
Raich will not only recognize a gain on the section 351 exchange,
but also will have a zero basis in the stock and securities received.
20
When the taxpayer subsequently sells the stock or securities, he will
realize and recognize the entire sale price as taxable gain.21 In net
effect, he will recognize two taxable gains as the result of his single
transfer of liabilities.
The following example illustrates the arbitrariness of the Raich
rule. Jones, a sole proprietor and cash method taxpayer, has tan-
gible assets in his business with a value of $25,000 and an adjusted
basis of $15,000. He also has trade accounts receivable worth
$20,000. His only liability consists of $20,000 in trade accounts pay-
able, all of which represent salary owed to employees and all of
which will qualify for a business deduction when paid.22 Assume
Jones wishes to transfer the sole proprietorship to a controlled cor-
poration for stock having a value of $25,000 (the net value of the
proprietorship). Under Raich, Jones will recognize $5,000 of gross
income23 and have a zero basis in the stock he receives in the
exchange.24 The acquiring corporation, on the other hand, will
recognize $17,777.78 of income when it collects the receivables, but
it will receive a deduction of $20,000 for satisfying the payables.
(The acquiring corporation will not recognize the full amount of
$20,000 as gross income when it collects the receivables because
the corporation's basis in the transferred assets (including the re-
20. Assume Smith incorporates his sole proprietorship by transferring the follow-
ing assets and liabilities to corporation X in exchange for all of the stock of X:
Assets Liabilities
Office Equipment $1,000 Accounts Payable $2,000
(basis: $1,000)
Accounts Receivable
(basis: $ 0) 3,000 $2,000
Total $4,000 Net Worth = $2,000
Under Raich, Smith would recognize $1,000 of gain under section 357(c) (the amount
by which his payables exceed the combined basis in the receivables and equipment).
Smith's basis in the X stock received in the exchange is computed as follows:
$1,000 (basis in property transferred)
- $2,000 (liabilities accepted (sections 358(a)(l)(A)(ii), (d))
+ $1,000 (gain recognized (sections 357(c), 358(a)(1)(B)(ii))
$0
21. IRC § 1001.
22. IRc § 162(a)(1).
23. Liabilities assumed ($20,000) minus aggregate adjusted basis in assets trans-
ferred ($15,000). See note 20 supra.
24. See note 20 supra.
[Vol. 73:461
A Definition of "Liabilities"
ceivables) is increased by the $5,000 gain recognized by Jones, and
the receivables' share of that basis allocation is $2,222.22.) If'in-
stead the acquiring corporation were to pay Jones $20,000 in cash
for his receivables, Jones would recognize a $20,000 gain. He could
then use the $20,000 to pay his salary obligations and obtain an
offsetting $20,000 deduction. Jones would then transfer the tangible
assets (and no liabilities) to the corporation; he would recognize no
income on the transaction and would have a $15,000 basis in the
stock received. Alternatively, Jones could retain the receivables and
payables and transfer the tangible assets to the corporation in ex-
change for its stock. Again, although Jones would recognize $20,000
of income when he collects the receivables, this gain would be off-
set by a $20,000 deduction when he satisfies the payables. He still
would recognize no gain on the exchange with the corporation and
be left with a $15,000 basis in the corporation's stock. While the
net transactional effects of these three alternatives are identical,
their tax consequences are vastly different.
The argument might be advanced that, in situations in which
receivables transferred by a cash method taxpayer exceed payables
transferred (by far the usual case), the Raich application of section
357(c) is justifiable under assignment of income principles as an
attempt to adjust for the tax benefits granted to a transferor by re-
fraining from taxing him on the income from the collection of the
assigned receivables. 25 For instance, suppose Jones, in the previous
example, had trade accounts receivable of $30,000 rather than
$20,000. If the marginal rate on Jones's personal income were
higher than the marginal rate on the corporation's income, the tax
burden on the excess receivables would be less if they were
transferred to and collected by the corporation. Arguably, the Raich
rule may be justified because it counterbalances the inequity of
allowing the cash method transferor to escape taxation on assigned
receivables, by imposing the double burden of requiring the tax-
payer to recognize gain upon a transfer of accounts payable and to
take back stock with a reduced basis.
This argument has several serious weaknesses. First, as explained
later,2 6 assignment of income principles should not be applied to a
transfer of receivables in a section 351 transaction, and apparently
the Service has not sought to apply them. The identical con-
siderations that render inappropriate the application of the assign-
25. Cf. Brief for Appellee at 21-22, Thatcher v. Commissioner, No. 74-2245 (9th
Cir. July 1, 1974) (awaiting argument).
26. See text at notes 73-79 infra.
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ment of income doctrine to a section 351 transfer of receivables
would also render inappropriate any indirect means of taxing the
transferor on such transactions. Second, even if'it were appropriate
to apply assignment of income principles to such transfers, those
principles should be applied directly by allocating the income from
the subsequent collection of the receivables to the transferor, rather
than indirectly by imposing income tax consequences on the trans-
feror according to. the amount of payables transferred. The amount
taxable to a transferor under the Raich rule does not correlate in
any way with the amount of tax benefit inuring to the transferor
from his transfer of the receivables, and, as previously noted, the
Raich rule operates capriciously in practice.
Thus, returning to the immediately preceding example, if Jones
had had $30,000 of receivables and had transferred the receivables
and payables to a controlled corporation for its stock, he would have
had a $5,000 gain on the exchange and a zero basis in the $35,000
worth of stock received.27 By restructuring his transactions as in
the previous example, however, Jones could have avoided the Raich
rule, recognizing no gain on the transfer to the corporation and
acquiring a $15,000 basis in the stock he received; 28 and he still
would have gained the benefit of having the $10,000 excess of
receivables over payables taxed to the corporation at the lower, cor-
porate rate.
29
The above discussion illustrates the inequity of the Raich rule.
Section 351 transactions that are virtually identical in economic
consequences receive radically different tax treatment. In effect,
Raich taxes the transferor on nonexistent income: The amount
27. $35,000 represents the net worth of the proprietorship, which has $30,000 in
receivables, $25,000 in other assets, and $20,000 in payables.
28. Under the first alternative, Jones would sell $20,000 of receivables to the
corporation for $20,000 in cash and use the proceeds to satisfy the payables. He
would then assign the assets of the business (including the remaining $10,000 of
receivables, but excluding all obligations) to the corporation for stock. Alternatively,
he could retain $20,000 of the receivables and the $20,000 of payables and assign the
remaining assets of the business (including $I0,000 of the receivables) to the corpo-
ration. In both alternatives, the corporation would pay tax on the collection of the
$10,000 of receivables assigned to it in exchange for stock. Under the first alternative,
the transferor would recognize $20,000 of income on the sale of that amount of
receivables to the corporation for cash, but he would receive a deduction of like
amount when he satisfies the payables. Similarly, under the second alternative, the
transferors recognition of $20,000 on collection of the receivables would be offset by
a $20,000 deduction on satisfaction of the payables. Under either alternative, irre-
spective of Raich, Jones would recognize no income on the transfers to the corpo.
ration because no liabilities would be transferred.
29. See note 28 supra.
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taxed to the transferor in Raich did not represent any accretion to
his net worth.
While one canon of statutory construction urges that statutes
be construed on the assumption that Congress did not intend to draw
arbitrary distinctions°---such as the distinction in tax treatment of
the three alternative plans described above-Congress nevertheless
has the power to adopt arbitrary measures (within constitutional
limitations), and courts must respect congressional directives. Raich
deserves doctrinal criticism, but many of the alternative approaches
that have been advanced lack both historical and statutory sup-
port,81 and accordingly are easy prey to the Tax Court's retort in
Raich:
We must assume that if Congress had . . . intended to limit this
section, it would have employed the necessary language. Finding
nothing in the language of section 357(c) or in the legislative history
of the 1954 Code to indicate any congressional intent to ... limit
the application of this provision, we must reject petitioners' argu-
ment and hold that a computation under section 357(c) is required
by the facts in this case.
... [I]n the absence of a dearly expressed congressional intent,
we decline to adopt a construction of section 357(c) which is sup-
ported neither by its language nor its legislative history.82
There are, however, compelling historical reasons for rejecting
the Raich approach. Raich rests on too broad an interpretation of
the term "liability" as that term is used in sections 357(c) and
358(d). As we shall show, the legislative and judicial history of
section 357 indicate that an obligation should not be treated as a
liability for the purposes of either section 357(c) or 358(d) to the
extent that its payment would have been deductible if made by the
transferor.
The origin of the term "liability" in sections 357(a), 357(c), and
358(d) is found in what is now commonly referred to as the "Crane
doctrine." Although the basic principles announced by the Supreme
Court in Crane v. Commissioner3 had been recognized and accepted
in administrative practice and judicial decisions"4 for some years,
30. See, e.g., United States v. American Trucking Assns., 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940);
Bongiovanni v. Commissioner, 470 F.2d 921, 924 (2d Cir. 1972).
31. See text at notes 82-102 infra.
32. Peter Raich, 46 T.C. 604, 609, 611 (1966).
33. 331 US. 1 (1947).
34. See notes 36-37 infra.
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Crane provided the most complete and authoritative expression of
those principles. The case involved a transfer of real property sub-
ject to a mortgage debt on which interest was overdue.85 Specifi-
cally, the Court held that the established practice of treating a
transferee's assumption of a transferor's personal liability as an
amount realized 6 was equally applicable to the transferee's accep-
tance of property subject to a liability: "If [the transferor] transfers
[property] subject to the mortgage, the benefit to him is as real and
substantial as if the mortgage were discharged, or as if a personal
debt in an equal amount had been assumed by another."8 7 The
Court noted with approval, however, that the Commissioner had
alleged that only the principal amount of the mortgage debt was
an amount realized by the transferor, and that the Commissioner
had not treated the overdue interest as an amount realized because
interest is "a deductible item."' 8
The wisdom of excluding deductible items under the Crane
doctrine is demonstrated by the "wash-out" of gain and loss on
deductible expense items from an economic perspective. For ex-
ample, if the overdue interest in Crane had been treated as an
amount realized by the transferor, subsequent payment of the
interest by the transferee should have provided the transferor with
a deduction for interest paid. The Crane doctrine treats assumed
liabilities as if the transferee had given the transferor money equal
to the debt and the transferor had himself paid the debt. The entire
transaction balances at zero, making it sound simply to ignore the
transfer of debts on deductible items.89 Moreover, Crane's exclusion
35. 331 U.S. at 3.
36. The Supreme Court ruled in 1929 that one person's payment of another's obli-
gation represents taxable income to the latter. United States v. Boston & M. R.R., 279
U.S. 732 (1929) (lessee paid lessor's income tax); Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929) (employer paid employee's federal income tax). Cf. Houston
Belt & Terminal Ry. v. Commissioner, 6 B.T.A. 1364 (1927); Providence & Worcester
R.R., 5 B.T.A. 1186 (1927), nonacquiescence, VII-1 Cum. BuLL. 39. A vendee's assump-
tion of the vendor's debt has long been taken into account in measuring the con-
sideration received by the vendor. See, e.g., United States v. Hendler, 303 U.S. 564
(1938); Stevenson Consol. Oil Co., 23 B.T.A. 610 (1931), acquiescence, XII-I CuM.
BuLL. 12; S.R. 1226, IV-I Cum. BUL.. 130 (1925). Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.112(a)-2 (1940),
issued under the 1939 Code, stated that the transferor of property subject to a lia-
bility would not recognize gain in an otherwise tax-free exchange, whether or not
he was personally liable. One implication of that regulation was that the transferor
would realize income on the exchange.
37. 331 U.S. at 14. Other courts had previously reached the same result. See, e.g.,
United States v. Hendler, 17 F. Supp. 558, 563 (D. Md. 1936), affd., 91 F.2d 680 (4th
Cir. 1937), revd. on other grounds, 303 U.S. 564 (1938), discussed in note 44 infra;
Brons Hotels, Inc. v. Commissioner, 34 B.T.A. 376 (1936).
38. 331 U.S. at 4 n.6 (emphasis added).
39. This was essentially the approach adopted by the Tax Court in J. Simpson
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A Definition of "Liabilities"
from amount realized of the assumption of debts for deductible
items is convenient in several respects. Unnecessary calculations on
the tax form are avoided, as are the potential administrative and
practical problems caused by income recognition in one year and
deduction in another. For example, if deductible items were not
excluded, a cash method taxpayer would recognize income from the
assumption of deductible liabilities on a sale of his property on the
date of the transfer. Unless the creditor relieved the transferor of
further liability on the debt (an atypical case), the transferor would
not receive an offsetting deduction until the transferee ultimately
satisfied the liability-possibly not until a subsequent taxable year.40
The administrative difficulty involved in tracing the transferee's
payment, which would be necessary to determine the date of the
transferor's deduction, and the tax-burden difference where the
transferor's effective tax rate for the year of transfer is different from
his rate for the year (or years) of payment make this an awkward
approach.
It is also significant that, while in some respects (apart from
differences in timing and tax rates) excluding the transferee's as-
sumption of a deductible obligation from the transferor's amount
realized is similar to the net effect of including the assumption as
an amount realized and allowing a tax deduction for the payment
of the obligation, in practice the effects are often quite dissimilar.
For example, the amount realized as a result of the assumption of
Dean, 35 T.C. 1083 (1961) (en banc), non-acquiescence, 1973-2 Cum. BULL. 4 (interest-
free loan does not cause borrower to recognize gain). See also Rev. Rule 55-713,
1955-2 Cit. BuLu. 28. But see General Aggregates Corp. v. Commissioner, 313 F.2d
25, 28 (1st Cir. 1963) (dictum).
40. Since a transferee's assumption of a debt does not satisfy the debt and typically
does not relieve the transferor of his liability vis-&-vis the creditor, there is no ap-
parent justification for granting the transferor a tax deduction until the debt is
actually satisfied. However, if the creditor agrees to relieve the transferor of any
further liability on the debt, then the creditor effectively accepts the transferees
obligation as full payment for the transferor's debt, and in such cases the transferor
should be permitted a deduction immediately upon the cancellation of his liability.
But cf. James M. Pierce Corp. v. Commissioner, 326 F.2d 67 (8th Cir. 1964), where a
newspaper publishing corporation sold its assets pursuant to a section 337 plan of
liquidation, and the purchaser paid cash and agreed to assume the liability of com-
pleting and redeeming outstanding subscriptions. Judge, later Justice, Blackmun
interpreted the Crane rule to cause the inclusion of the subscription reserve in the
purchase price and to allow the corporation an offsetting deduction in the same
amount. Applying Pierce by analogy, one Tax Court judge would treat an assumption
of liabilities by a transferee corporation in a section 351 transfer as equivalent to
the payment of those liabilities, which provides the transferor with an immediate
deduction on the date of their assumption. Wilford E. Thatcher, 61 T.C. 28, 42
(1978) (Hall, J., dissenting), appeal docketed, No. 74-2245, 9th Cir., July 1, 1974.
Such a result, however, raises significant problems. See text at notes 102 infra. See also
Wellen, New Solutions to the Section 357(e) Problem, 52 TAXES 861, 869-70 (1974).
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the liability may be treated as a capital gain, while the offsetting
deduction may be an ordinary deduction. In that event, the tax-
payer normally would be better off if he were allowed a deduction
and denied nonrecognition than he would be under Crane's exclu-
sion approach.41 The Commissioner and the Crane Court, however,
apparently found it convenient simply to ignore the difference be-
tween capital and ordinary income items and to exclude deductible
obligations assumed from the amount realized.
Legislative history demonstrates that the exclusion of the assump-
tion of deductible liabilities under the Crane doctrine was incor-
porated into sections 357 and 358: The term "liabilities" in those
sections refers only to obligations the transfer of which would cause
realization of income to the transferor under Crane.
Section 112(k) of the 1939 Code42--the predecessor of section
357-was adopted to modify the effect of the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in United States v. Hendler,48 in which the Court had held that
secured mortgage bonds assumed by a transferee in a reorganization
constituted boot ("money received" 44) to the transferor and caused
it to recognize income. Although Hendler was decided nine years
earlier than Crane, the principles expressly enunciated in Crane
were implicit in Hendler:45 The Court in Hendler must have con-
templated that the assumption of the mortgage bonds caused income
realization to have held that it also caused gain recognition. Con-
gress, worried about the effect of the decision on tax-free reorganiza-
tions and transfers to controlled corporations, 46 promptly enacted
41. Assume Jones sells his home (with a basis of $5,000) for $10,000 cash plus the
transferee's assumption of Jones's $5,000 mortgage and $1,000 overdue interest obli-
gation. Under the exclusion approach Jones would recognize a $10,000 capital gain.
Under the alternative approach, he would recognize an $11,000 capital gain and ap-
ply a $1,000 deduction against his ordinary income.
42. 53 Stat. 87.
43. 803 U.S. 564 (1938). Both the House and Senate committee reports recom-
mended passage of section 112(k) and stated: "This change was made in view of the
Hendler case ...." H.R. REP. No. 855, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1939), reprinted in
1939-2 Cum. BuL. 504, 507, 518-20; S. REP. No. 648, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1939),
reprinted in 1939-2 Cuss. BuLL. 524-25. See also Hearings Before Comm. on Ways
and Means on Revenue Revision, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 44-52, 59-62, 91-93, 106, 260.61
(1939).
44. Although the lower courts in Hendler deferred recognition of the gain repre-
sented by the ,assumption of the mortgage bonds, they indicated in dicta that, under
traditional principles, gain was realized by the transferor of the bonds. United States
v. Hendler, 17 F. Supp. 558, 563 (D. Md. 1936), affd., 91 F.2d 680, 682 (4th Cir. 1937).
45. The Crane Court in fact cited Hendler as support for its treatment of an
assumed obligation. 331 US. at 13.
46. The predecessor of section 351, Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, §§ 112(b)(5), (c),
(e), 53 Stat. 37, 39, also caused gain to be recognized to the extent of money received
in an exchange between a transferor and a controlled corporation.
470 [Vol. 73:461
A Definition of "Liabilities"
section 112(k).47 Congress did not reject Hendler's application of
what was later called the Crane doctrine; it merely postponed recog-
nition of the gain realized by reducing the transferor's basis in
stocks and securities received in a section 351 exchange by the
amount of liabilities transferred to the corporation.48 In net effect,
the amount realized through a transfer of a liability was treated as
a return of capital. Section 357(a), therefore, was and is intended to
affect only those liabilities that, if assumed by a transferee corpora-
tion in a tax-free exchange, would cause gain recognition.
Section 358(d), originally enacted to effect a basis adjustment for
gain on which recognition was postponed under the predecessor of
section 357(a),49 also should be applied only to the assumption of
obligations that would cause income recognition under the Crane
doctrine. Congress intended sections 357(a) and 358(d) to be liberal-
izing provisions-they were enacted to defer recognition of income
that otherwise would have been recognized at an earlier date.50
Congress had no intention of penalizing transferors by reducing
their stock's basis on a transfer of obligations that would not have
caused some recognition under Hendler.
The same analysis applies to section 357(c), which was enacted
in 1954 to correct a technical flaw in the post-Hendler deferral
mechanism.51 When assumed liabilities on which gain was deferred
exceeded the aggregate adjusted basis of the property transferred,
the question arose as to how the excess should be treated. Rather
than grant a total tax exemption for the amount realized on the
excess, Congress could have either deferred recognition by giving
the transferor a negative basis in the stock and securities received
in the exchange5 2 or taxed the excess immediately. It adopted the
47. Revenue Act of 1939, §§ 213(a)-(c), 53 Stat. 870, amending Int. Rev. Code of
1939, § 112 [now IRC §§ 357(a), (b),.368(a)(1)].
48. Revenue Act of 1939, § 213(d), 53 Stat. 871, amending Int. Rev. Code of 1939,
§ 113(a)(6) [now IRC § 358(d)].
49. See text at note 48 supra.
50. See Surrey, Assumption of Indebtedness in Tax-Free Exchanges, 50 YALE L.J.
1, 10-14 (1940).
51. The congressional committee reports cast no light on the purpose for adopting
siection 357(c). Most commentators suggest that the purpose was to avoid the problems
of a negative basis. Cooper, Negative Basis, 75 HARV. L. Rv. 1352, 1359 (1962);
Comment, Section 357(c) and the Cash Basis Taxpayer, 115 U. PA. L. Ray. 1154 (1967).
But see David Rosen, 62 T.C. 11, 19 n.3 (1974), suggesting that the provision was
designed to preclude a taxpayer from depreciating an asset purchased with bor-
rowed funds and then transferring the liability to a controlled corporation.
52. See, e.g., Jack L. Easson, 33 T.C. 963 (1960), revd., 294 F.2d 653 (9th Cir. 1961).
See also Parker v. Delaney, 186 F.2d 455, 459 (Ist Cir. 1950) (Magruder, J., concur-
ring), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 926 (1951); Cooper, supra note 51.
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latter alternative, declaring that "such excess shall be considered as
a gain from the sale or exchange" of the asset involved.53 The lan-
guage of section 357 indicates that section 357(c) operates solely as
an exception to section 357(a).54 Where section 357(a) does not
apply, section 357(c) should not apply. Incorporation of the Crane
doctrine into section 357(a), therefore, should also limit the ap-
plicability of section 357(c). The term "liability" in both sections
should be limited to those obligations that, if transferred, would
constitute an amount realized by the transferor under the Crane
doctrine.
The remaining question in so far as legislative history is con-
cerned is whether Hendler incorporated Crane's treatment of as-
sumptions of deductible obligations. While Crane was grounded in
precedent established long before Hendler,5 it is not clear whether
Crane was the first instance in which the assumption of deductible
obligations was excluded from amount realized or whether that
aspect of Crane merely reflected an established administrative prac-
tice that accompanied the assumption of liability doctrines from
their inception. Some early cancellation of indebtedness cases im-
plicitly adopted the exclusion treatment noted in Crane,o but there
is some contrary early precedent for the practice of including the
assumed debt in amount realized and allowing a deduction for its
payment.57
Despite the ambiguity of the precedents prior to Hendler, sev-
eral considerations support reading Hendler to include the Crane
disposition of the assumption of deductible obligations. First, the
paucity of exclusion cases does not indicate a contrary administra-
tive practice: If exclusion were the existing administrative rule, the
538. IRC § 857(c).
54. This construction also conforms with the indicated purpose of section 357(c)
to avoid a negative basis on the transfer of liabilities covered by sections 857(a) and
858(d).
55. See text at notes 88-86 supra.
56. See, e.g., George Aftergood, 21 T.C. 60 (1958), acquiescence, 1954-1 CUM. BULL.
8 (Taxpayer's debt of $8,000 was forgiven in settlement. Since taxpayer's obligation
arose out of his position as guarantor of a debt of the corporation in which taxpayer
was a shareholder, taxpayer's payment of that obligation would have entitled him to
a non-business bad debt deduction. See IRC § 166. Held: taxpayer did not recognize
income when the obligation was forgiven); Iceland, Inc., 23 B.T.A. 15 (1931), acqui-
escence, X-2 Cur. BuLu. 84 (forgiven back rent had never been accrued or deducted
by the taxpayer and therefore was not income).
57. See Norman Cooledge, 40 B.T.A. 1325 (1939), acquiescence, 1940-1 Cum. BULL.
2 (taxpayer sold real estate subject to taxes and interest that had accrued against the
property and taxpayer prior to sale; transferee's payment of the taxes was included
in the purchase price and deducted by taxpayer); S.M. 4122, V-1 CuAr. BULL. 55.
Cf. Rev. Rul. 75-68, 1975 INT. REV. BuLL. No. 9, at 7.
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issue would not often reach the courts. The Commissioner would
not seek to force income recognition since that would be contrary
to the administrative practice, and in most cases the taxpayer would
not wish to litigate the question.58 In fact, in Crane itself the Com-
missioner did not seek to force income recognition on the assump-
tion of the obligation to pay the defaulted interest on the assumed
mortgage, and it is only through a chance footnote in the Court's
opinion that we know of the Commissioner's position. 9 In addition,
exclusion offers such substantial administrative convenience 0 as to
suggest strongly that the Commissioner's position in Crane reflected
longstanding pre-Hendler practice.
Even if HendIer did not incorporate the exclusion approach,
Crane, as the most authoritative decision on the assumption of
liability doctrine, should control the construction of the transfer of
liability doctrine that was clearly adopted by Hendler and embodied
in sections 357 and 358(d). Thus, when Congress adopted sections
357 and 358, it intended that they apply only to the transfer of
obligations that would cause the transferor to recognize gain. Con-
gress did not specify precisely which obligations would cause recog-
nition of gain when transferred, but since Crane establishes that the
transfer of deductible obligations does not cause gain realization
(and thus does not cause gain recognition), such obligations are not
covered by sections 357 and 358.
If this exclusion theory had been used in Raich, most (perhaps
all) of Raich's trade accounts payable would not have constituted
liabilities under section 357(c) and would not have reduced the
basis of the stock he received under section 358(d), because had
Raich satisfied those payables they would likely have been deduc-
tible." ' Any interest due on his notes payable 2 also would have
been excluded, because such interest also would have been de-
ductible if paid by Raich. 3 Other obligations that should normally
be excluded from section 357(c) treatment are rental obligations and
salary obligations. The principal of a mortgage debt would not be
excluded, however, for the transferor would not enjoy an additional
tax benefit by paying the mortgage debt himself. Similarly, other
58. But see note 41 supra and accompanying text.
59. 331 U.S. at 4 n.6.
60. See text following note 88 supra.
61. IRC §§ 162, 212. Most trade accounts payables are deductible.
62. See note 12 supra.
63. IRC § 163. The Tax Court in Raich apparently did not include interest in
its computation of liabilities.
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capital expense obligations that would be reflected in the basis of
the transferor's assets immediately upon his incurring the obliga-
tion should not be excluded.6
There is one significant difference in the treatment of the trans-
fer of assets subject to a liability in a Crane-type exchange and in
the treatment of such transfers in a section 351 exchange. In an
exchange of property not qualifying for section 351 treatment, the
transferee cannot deduct payments subsequently made by him on
the transferred liability, because the accepted debt is part of the
transferee's purchase price.65 Thus, the transferee in Crane would
not have been entitled to a deduction when he paid the defaulted
interest to the creditor. On the other hand, while the Code is silent
about whether a section 351 transferee can deduct its subsequent
payment of liabilities that were deductible in the hands of the
transferor, the Internal Revenue Service has permitted such deduc-
tions in most cases.66
If there is an inequity in both allowing the transferee corpora-
tion to take a deduction and allowing the transferor to exclude the
transfer of the deductible debts from a determination of his gain,
the proper cure would be to deny a deduction to the transferee
corporation rather than to tax the transferor on a nonexistent gain
through an overextension of section 857. In fact, however, such a
"double" tax benefit may be an appropriate means of implementing
the recognized congressional policy of removing tax deterrents to
the incorporation or reorganization of businesses. Congress has
expressly granted one type of "double" tax benefit where depreciated
property (that is, property whose basis is greater than its value) is
transferred to a controlled corporation in exchange for its stock:
The transferor's basis in the stock received in exchange equals his
basis in the transferred property, yet the transferee corporation also
64. E.g., legal fees incurred in the defense of title to property. See Woodward v.
Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572 (1970).
65. Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. I (1947) (assumption of mortgage obligation);
Commissioner v. Oxford Paper Co., 194 F.2d 190 (2d Cir. 1952) (assumption of lessee's
obligations); Consolidated Coke Co. v. Commissioner, 70 F.2d 446 (3d Cir. 1934)
(assumption of mortgage obligation and promissory notes).
66. See Points To Remember, 18 THE TAX LAWYER, April 1965, at 114; Worthy, IRS
Chief Counsel Outlines What Lies Ahead for Professional Corporations, 32 J. TAX.
88, 90-91 (1970). See also Bongiovanni v. Commissioner, 470 F.2d 921, 925 (Rd Cir.
1972). But see Holdcraft Transp. Co. v. Commissioner, 153 F.2d 323 (Ist Cir. 1946);
Athol Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 54 F.2d 230 (1st Cir. 1931); M. Buten & Sons, Inc.,
P-H TAx CT. MEM. 72,044 (1972) (transferee corporation denied a deduction for
guaranteed payments to widow of a deceased partner of partnership whose assets
and liabilities, including obligation to make guaranteed payment, had been trans.
ferred to the corporation).
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assumes the transferor's basis in the property.67 In addition, section
381, dealing with the carryover of tax attributes in reorganizations
under sections 368(a)(1)(A), (C), (F), and in some cases (D), ensures
the transferee in such reorganizations a deduction for an assumed
liability of the transferor.6 8 It would appear that the policy behind
section 381, the encouragement of tax-free changes in corporate
form, should also apply to section 351 transfers. Indeed, in some
cases a transaction may qualify both as a tax-free exchange under
section 351 and as a reorganization under sections 368(a)(1)(C), (D),
or (F).69 While the Senate Report on the 1954 Code states that
section 381 was not intended to affect the carryover treatment of
tax attributes in corporate transactions not described in section
381(a),71 the same considerations that led to the adoption of section
381 could shed light on the pr6per treatment of section 351
exchanges.
In sum, Congress through section 351 sought to minimize tax
deterrents to the incorporation of a business by precluding the
imposition of any tax burdens on the formation of a corporation
(other than tax consequences necessary to protect the integrity of the
income tax system).71 In the Raich case, if Raich had not incor-
porated his proprietorship, he would have collected his trade ac-
counts receivable and recognized that income. In addition, he would
have received a deduction for the payment of his trade accounts
payable. The net tax consequence from these two items would
have been a taxable income of $39,641.88.72 If, by our hypothesis,
Raich's transfer of the payables in a section 351 exchange had not
67. ILC §§ 858, 862. The transferor can recognize a tax loss on his sale of the
corporation's stock and the corporation can also recognize a tax loss on its sale of the
property received from the transferor. Note, however, that if appreciated property
(property whose value exceeds its basis) is transferred to the corporation, there is no
special tax benefit to the parties and, indeed, the assignment of the same basis to
both the corporation's stock and the transferred assets may result in a tax detriment
to the parties. Just as the dual basis provision is advantageous only where depre-
dated property is transferred, so the granting of a deduction to the transferee cor-
poration for the payment of transferred payables provides a double benefit only
where the amount of the payables exceeds the amount of the transferred receivables;
otherwise the deduction for the payables is fully offset by the income recognized on
collecting the receivables.
68. IRC §§ 881(c)(4), (16); Treas. Reg. § 1.381(c)(4)-1 (1964).
69. Assume corporation A transfers all of its assets and liabilities to corporation
B, a new corporation, solely in exchange for 40 per cent of B's voting stock. As part
of the same transaction, other persons also transfer property to B in exchange for
45 per cent of its voting stock. The exchange by corporation A qualifies both under
section 851 and as a reorganization under section 868(a)(1)(C).
70. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 277 (1954).
71. See note 76 infra.
72. See note 12 supra.
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generated recognized gain, the transferee corporation then con-
trolled by Raich would have had the same tax position as Raich
would have had. The corporation would have recognized $77,361.66
of income when it collected the receivables and would have received
a $37,719.78 deduction when it paid the debts represented by the
payables. Thus, the business would have shown a taxable income
of $39,641.88 whether the business was in a corporate or proprietor-
ship form-the desired result.
Because the corporation (rather than Raich) was taxed on the
receivables, and because the corporation may have had a lower tax
rate, the question arises whether "assignment of income" concepts78
should be applied to such transferred receivables. While the as-
signment of income doctrine has been applied to section 351 ex-
changes in a few circumstances,7" it appears inappropriate to apply
it to the transfer of income-producing assets (including accounts
receivable) of a going business, at least where the assets are such as
are typically held by such businesses and where, therefore, no tax
avoidance purpose appears to have motivated the transfer.7 Applica-
tion of the assignment of income doctrine to such assets in section
351 transfers would undermine Congress' policy in adopting that
section, namely, the removal of tax impediments to incorporation
and some types of corporate reorganizations. 76 Just as it is inappro-
73. "The prindple of Lucas v. Earl [281 U.S. 111, 114-15 (1930)], that he who earns
income may not avoid taxation through anticipatory arrangements no matter how
clever or subtle, has been repeatedly invoked by this Court and stands today as a
cornerstone of our graduated income tax system." United States v. Basye, 410 U.S.
441, 450 (1973). See also Commissioner v. First Security Bank of Utah, 405 U.S. 394
(1972); Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733 (1949); Commissioner V. Sunnen,
333 U.S. 591 (1948); Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122 (1940); Helvering v. Horst,
311 U.S. 112 (1940).
74. See, e.g., Palmer v. Commissioner, 267 F.2d 434 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 821 (1959) (assignment of construction contract earnings); Brown v. Commis-
sioner, 115 F.2d 337 (2d Cir. 1940) (assignment of fees for legal services); Adolph
Weinberg, 44 T.C. 233 (1965), affd. per curiam sub nom. Commissioner v. Sugar
Daddy, Inc., 386 F.2d 836 (9th Cir. 1967) (assignment of income from crops); Clinton
Davidson, 43 B.T.A. 576 (1941), acquiescence, 1941-1 Cum. BuLL. 3 (assignment of
insurance commissions).
75. Several courts would apply the assignment of income doctrine to section 351
exchanges only where tax avoidance (rather than a legitimate business purpose)
motivated the exchange. See, e.g., Hempt Bros., Inc. v. United States, 490 F.2d 1172
(3d Cir. 1974).
76. Section 351 was intended to facilitate business reorganizations based on valid
business reasons by affording them tax-free treatment. Bongiovanni v. Commissioner,
470 F.2d 921, 924 (2d Cir. 1972). In recommending enactment of section 351's prede.
cessor in 1921, the committee reports noted that the provision would "permit business
to go forward with the readjustments required by existing conditions . . . ." H.R.
REP. No. 350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1921), reprinted in 1939-1 Cum. Bu.LL. pt. II,
at 168, 176; S. REP. No. 275, 67th Cong., Ist Sess. 11 (1921), reprinted in 1939-1 Cum.
BuLL. pt. II, at 181, 189. Nash v. United States, 398 U.S. 1 (1970), is an example of
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priate to apply assignment of income principles to the transfer of
trade accounts receivable in a section 861 reorganization,7 it is
inappropriate to apply them to a transfer of receivables pursuant to
a section 851 exchange.78 In apparent recognition of these considera-
tions, the Service (at least since 1965) has taxed the transferee cor-
poration (rather than the transferor) on the collection of receivables
assigned to it for good business reasons pursuant to a section 851
exchange.79
The operation of the Crane principle as incorporated into sec-
tions 357 and 358 to transfers of accounts payable may be better un-
derstood by contrasting the treatment of transfers by a cash method
transferor with that of transfers by an accrual method transferor who
previously accrued and deducted his payables, but who (because of
other losses) did not derive any tax benefit from those deductions.
In one sense, it might appear. that the status of the accrual method
taxpayer is essentially the same as that of the cash method taxpayer,
who also has not derived any tax benefit from his outstanding
obligations because he has not yet deducted them. However, the
the Court's liberal attitude toward section 351 exchanges. In Nash the Court refused
to apply the tax benefit rule to require a transferor of accounts receivable to recog-
nize income in the amount of previously deducted bad-debt reserves that were rea-
sonable in amount.
77. See Treas. Reg. § 1.381(c)(4)-1 (1964). But see note 70 supra and accompanying
text.
78. As the Third Circuit stated: "While we cannot fault the general principle
'that income be taxed to him who earns it,' to adopt taxpayer's argument would be
to hamper the incorporation of ongoing businesses; additionally it would impose
technical constructions which are economically and practically unsound," Hempt
Bros., Inc. v. United States, 490 F.2d 1172, 1177 (3d Cir. 1974). See also Thomas W.
Briggs, P-H TAx CT. MEm 56,086 (1956) (uncollected service fees). Other cases
have allowed the transferee corporation to collect and pay tax on the receivables
assumed in a section 351 exchange without a discussion of the assignment of income
problem. See, e.g., Wilford E. Thatcher, 61 T.C. 28 (1973), appeal docketed, No. 74-
2245, 9th Cir., July 1, 1974; Peter Raich, 46 T.C. 604 (1966). Cases not dealing with
accounts receivable have similarly limited the application of the assignment of income
doctrine in section 351 exchanges. See, e.g., Divine v. United States, 10 Am. Fed. Tax.
R.2d 5403 (W.D. Tenn. 1962) (earnings on construction contract); Arthur L. Kniffen,
39 T.C. 553 (1962), acquiescence, 1965-2 Cu. BuuL. 5 (accrued interest). Note that
when an installment obligation is transferred in a section 351 exchange, the transferor
does not recognize income on the transfer and the transferee recognizes income when
the debt is collected. Treas. Reg. § 1.453-9(c)(2) (1958).
79. Points To Remember, supra note 66. See Hempt Bros., Inc. v. United States,
490 F.2d 1172 (3d Cir. 1974); Worthy, supra note 66. See also Rev. Proc. 68-23, 1968-1
CuM. BuLL. 821, 823, stating that a favorable section 367 ruling will not be issued if
accounts receivable are transferred to a foreign corporation "unless the income at-
tributable to such property has been or will be included in the gross income of the
transferor .... " This condition would be unnecessary if accounts receivable were
normally taxed to the transferor. Of course, the reason for imposing the condition on
transfers to a foreign corporation is that the transferee will incur no United States
tax liability on its collection of the receivables.
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similarity is superficial. The assumption of a deductible obligation
of a cash method taxpayer should enjoy nonrecognition under Crane
not because the transferor derived no prior tax benefit from in-
curring the obligation,80 but because the taxpayer would have been
entitled to an additional benefit (a deduction) when he paid the
obligation, and it would be inequitable simultaneously to treat the
assumed liability as income to the taxpayer and to deny him the
tax benefit for the satisfaction of that debt."' Where the assumed
obligation is previously accrued by an accrual method taxpayer,
actual payment by the taxpayer would generate no additional tax
benefit; the assumption of such a debt should constitute gross in-
come whether or not the taxpayer previously benefited by the deduc-
tion. Similarly, a cash method taxpayer who transfers a liability that
would not have been deductible to him should realize gain irrespec-
tive of whether he enjoyed a prior tax benefit, because his payment
of that debt would not have entitled him to an additional tax
benefit.
Several commentators8 2 and judges have perceived the inequity
of the Tax Court's decision in Raich and have suggested routes for
reaching a contrary result. One alternative is that adopted by the
Second Circuit in Bongiovanni v. Commissioner.3 Reversing the
Tax Court, the court of appeals held that the term "liability" in
section 857(c) does not include accounts payable: "Section 357(c)
was meant to apply to what might be called 'tax liabilities,' i.e., liens
in excess of tax costs, particularly mortgages encumbering property
transferred in a Section 351 transaction .... The payables of a cash
basis taxpayer are liabilities for accounting purposes but should not
be considered liabilities for tax purposes under Section 357(c) until
80. But see text at notes 92-93 supra.
81. Although the taxpayer possibly would not be denied a subsequent deduction
upon satisfaction of the debt in the non-section 351 context, see text preceding note
39 supra; cases cited note 57 supra, there is no statutory support for allowing the
transferor a deduction in a section 351 exchange. See text at notes 97-102 infra.
82. See O'Connor, Tax Problems on Transfers of Assets to Corporations, 52 TAXEs
756 (1974); Wellen, supra note 40; Note, Payables of Cash Basis Taxpayers Under
Section 357(c), 10 Housron L. Rav. 1170 (1973); Note, Bongiovanni v. Commissioner,
61 ILL. B.J. 557 (1973); Comment, Section 357(c): The Quest for Equality Between
Accrual and Cash Basis Taxpayers, 52 Na. L. Rxv. 527 (1973); Comment, supra
note 51; Note, Bongiovanni v. Commissioner: Tax-Free Transfer of Payables by Cash
Method Taxpayer upon Incorporation, 35 U. Prrr. L. Rav. 158 (1973); Comment,
Bongiovanni v. Commissioner: False Hopes for Cash Basis Taxpayers, 10 SAN Dmrco
L. REv. 857 (1973); Note, Tax-Free Transfers to Controlled Corporations, 76 W. VA.
L. Rav. 401 (1974); 7 GA. L. REv. 571 (1973); 1973 U. Iu. LF. 402 (1973); 22 VAND. L.
Rav. 887 (1973).
83. 470 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1972).
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they are paid."8 4 While a literal reading of the court's emphasis on
"liens" might suggest that all unsecured loans are exempt from
section 357(c), it is doubtful that the court intended that meaning.85
There is no reason why the absence of security for a debt should be
relevant to the determination of whether section 357(c) will apply to
the transfer of the debt: A sole proprietor who borrows $10,000 on
his unsecured note and later transfers the note to a controlled cor-
poration in a section 351 exchange should treat the note as a liability
for purposes of both sections 357(c) and 358(d). Bongiovanni's
apparent exclusion of all accounts payable from the definition of
"liabilities" is too broad; only those payables that would provide
the transferor with a tax benefit (e.g., a deduction) when paid by
him should be excluded.8 6
The major problem with Bongiovanni is the rationale offered
by the court. Apparently, the court excluded accounts payable from
section 357(c) to ensure that cash method taxpayers are not taxed
more harshly on incorporating their businesses than are accrual
method taxpayers. 87 It is highly doubtful that such equality is re-
quired: Cash and accrual method taxpayers often incur unequal tax
treatment even in the context of section 351. Since cash method
accounting is a form of deferral, taxpayers who elect to use the cash
method frequently enjoy great advantages as against accrual method
taxpayers. For example, where his accounts receivable greatly exceed
his payables, the cash method transferor in a section 351 exchange
effectively assigns his potential tax liability on the receivables to the
corporation, there to be taxed at a possibly lower rate.8 8 An accrual
basis transferor will not have that opportunity. It would seem
reasonable that just as in certain circumstances a cash method tax-
payer can enjoy a tax advantage vis-it-vis an accrual method taxpayer
on incorporating a business, so in certain circumstances the cash
method taxpayer can be disadvantaged. The evil in the Raich
rule lies not in its disparate treatment of taxpayers who use dif-
ferent methods of accounting, but in the taxation of nonexistent
84. 470 F.2d at 924 (emphasis original).
85. Such an exclusion has been rejected by the Tax Court and the Seventh Circuit.
N.F. Testor, 40 T.C. 273 (1963), affd., 327 F.2d 788 (7th Cir. 1964).
86. Some transferred accounts payable may be related to capital expenditures and
thus may have previously increased the basis of a capital asset when the obligation
was incurred. For example, salary obligations to employees who construct a capital
asset are not deductible obligations. Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1, 13
(1974). No further tax benefit would therefore be available upon payment of the debt.
87. 470 F.2d at 924-25.
88. See text at note 25 supra.
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income created artificially by an erroneous statutory construction.
While the Second Circuit reached the correct result in Bongiovanni,
the court failed to provide a logical standard for determining which
obligations should constitute tax liabilities within the meaning of
sections 357 and 358. Accordingly, the Tax Court89 and several
commentators9" have repudiated Bongiovanni as contrary to clear
statutory language.
Judge Quealy, dissenting in part in Wilford E. Thatcher,91 argues
that in Bongiovanni "a distinction is made not on the basis of
'secured liabilities,' but on the basis whether the liability in question
was reflected in determining the income and expense of the taxpayer
on a cash basis."92 He would consider as section 357(c) liabilities
only those obligations that can be linked to some ascertainable and
previously accrued tax benefit. He explains the distinction as
follows:
Where a taxpayer buys a depredable asset with borrowed funds,
the deduction for depredation enters into the computation of the
taxpayer's income on a cash basis of accounting regardless whether
the borrowings constitute a lien on the asset or represent a general
obligation of the taxpayer. The indebtedness is reflected in the tax-
payer's accounting. On the other hand, where the liability represents
an inventoriable or deductible expense it cannot be reflected in the
computation of income on a cash basis until paid.03
The result Judge Quealy recommends may be very close to the
position we advocate. However, Judge Quealy failed to offer a
rationale for construing section 357(c) as he does, and (except for
those obligations he specifically mentioned) his apparent definition
of the term "liability" as an indebtedness that is "reflected in the
taxpayer's accounting" is not especially helpful in distinguishing
"liability" obligations from "nonliability" obligations. We believe
that it is more helpful in making that distinction to focus on whether
the transferor would have derived a tax deduction from the payment
of the obligation had he satisfied the debt himself.
In a recent article, Professor Del Cotto adopts a position similar
to Judge Quealy's and argues that the term "liabilities" refers only
89. David Rosen, 62 T.C. 11, 19 (1974); Wilford E. Thatcher, 61 T.C. 28, 36-37
(1973), appeal docketed, No. 74-2245, 9th Cir., July 1, 1974.
90. See, e.g., Wellen, supra note 40, at 72-73, 77-78; 7 GA. L. Rav. 571, 577 (1973).
91. 61 T.C. 28, 39 (1973), appeal docketed, No. 74-2245, 9th Cir., July 1, 1974.
92. 61 T.C. at 40.
93. 61 T.C. at 40-41.
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to those "liabilities which have given rise to a 'tax benefit.' "94 Pro-
fessor Del Cotto apparently restricts the term "tax benefit" to "those
liabilities which given rise to deductions by the transferor or have
arisen from a tax-free borrowing by the transferor on the value of
the transferred assets." 95 Although this test is close to the standard
we have proposed, there are significant differences, as the following
example illustrates: Suppose Smith, a cash method sole proprietor
in the trucking business, is subjected to a $5,000 fine by the state
government for transporting goods in overloaded trucks. In addi-
tion, Smith incurs an obligation to pay wages of $40,000 to his
employees; because of a wage-price freeze then in effect, however,
the salaries in excess of $32,000 are determined to be illegal. Smith
assigns his business to a controlled corporation, and for good
business reasons the corporation assumes Smith's obligation to pay
the fine and the salaries. Neither the payment of the fine nor the
payment of the $8,000 of excess salary is deductible.9 6 Under our
approach, those obligations should constitute liabilities for pur-
poses of sections 357 and 358, and similarly would be treated as
liabilities under the Crane doctrine, because their subsequent pay-
ment would not give rise to a deduction or comparable tax benefit.
Under the test propounded by Judge Quealy and Professor Del
Cotto, however, such items might well be excluded from section 357
because no deduction had been allowed on their account and they
did not represent borrowings on transferred assets.
Judge Hall, also dissenting in Thatcher,97 advanced an alterna-
tive theory. Although acknowledging that typically no deductions
are available in section 351 exchanges,98 she contends that section
357(c) turns the transaction into an ordinary exchange for the pur-
pose of recognizing gain. Since Judge Hall maintained that a trans-
feror receives an immediate deduction for the assumption of his
deductible obligation in an ordinary sale,9 9 she concluded that the
transferor should receive a deduction for his trade accounts payable
94. Del Cotto, Section 357(c): Some Observations on Tax Effects to the Cash Basis
Taxpayer, 24 BurFALo L. Rav. 1, 6 (1974).
95. Id. at 1.
96. IRC §§ 162(c)(2), (f). See Rev. Rul. 72-236, 1972-1 Cutm. BuLL. 41.
97. 61 T.C. at 42. Judges Forrester and Featherston joined in Judge Hall's dissent.
98. See, e.g., Doggett v. Commissioner, 275 F.2d 823 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 364
U.S. 824 (1960) (tax-free incorporation of a going business); Citizens Natl. Trust &
Say. Bank v. Welch, 119 F.2d 717 (9th Cir. 1941) (corporate reorganization); Arthur L.
Kniffen, 29 T.C. 553 (1962), acquiescence, 1965-2 Cura. BuLL. 5 (tax-free incorporation
of a going business).
99. For a contrary view, see note 49 supra and accompanying text.
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to the extent of the accounts receivable or the gain recognized under
section 857(c), whichever is less. 10 0 This approach raises at least two
problems. First, cash method taxpayers would benefit only if they
transfer a significant amount of accounts receivable. However, a
transferor's deductible payables should be excluded and his non-
deductible payables included in determining liabilities under sec-
tions 857 and 358 without regard to the amount of uncollected
receivables. In addition, a particular section 357(c) gain may not be
fully allocable to the accounts receivable; 1' 1 for example, part of such
gain may be allocated to capital assets and so be characterized as long-
term capital gain, which will be taxed at lower rates than ordinary
income, and thus the ordinary deduction to which Judge Hall
deems the transferor of accounts payable to be entitled will not
constitute a "wash" with the section 357(c) gain to the extent that
the latter constitutes capital gain.102
The Tax Court's decision in Raich and the Second Circuit's
decision in Bongiovanni have stimulated great interest and inquiry
about the tax treatment of liabilities in a section 351 transfer. While
a cynical observer might assert that there has been much grappling
in the dark for a conceptual handle, the better view is that the
variety of solutions proposed for the Raich problem indicates that
its significance has not escaped notice. Hopefully, a reexamination
of sections 357 and 358 in light of Crane, Hendler, and the admin-
istrative practices on which those cases were grounded will shed
light on the scope of those provisions.
100. "As a matter of appropriate allocation, in the case of incorporation of a cash
basis business, the trade accounts payable should, for this purpose, be netted against
the trade accounts receivable, up to the lesser of the trade accounts payable or the
amount of liabilities treated as paid under section 357(c)." 61 T.C. at 43.
101. Treas. Reg. § 1.357-2 (1955) provides that gain generated by section 357(c) is
to be allocated among the transferred assets according to their respective fair market
values and characterized accordingly.
102. The fact that the deduction of the payables under Judge Hall's approach may
not constitute a "wash" of the gain recognized does not itself make that result
undesirable. There is no reason why such an exchange could not create an ordinary
deduction and a capital gain for the taxpayer, but that is a different result from the
one described in Judge Hall's opinion. For a discussion of the reasons for rejecting
an immediate deduction of the payables, see notes 39-41 supra and accompanying
text.
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